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I.

INTRODUCTION: IS THAT REALLY ME?

“[W]ithout corroboration, there is absolutely no way to know whether
somebody’s memory is a real memory or a product of suggestion.”
-Elizabeth Loftus 2
You are bickering with your significant other during the height of an
argument as your partner begins to hurl corrosive, malicious, and fraudulent
accusations your way. You seemingly become more and more confused as
your significant other asserts you have done the unthinkable: cheated. As
thoughts and concerns swirl around your baffled mind, you offer yourself
some comfort as you know it is not true, and hopefully a thorough
explanation can clear the air. As you begin defending your chastity, your
significant other pulls out their cell phone and shows you something you
cannot fathom. There, right there, in physical, audio, and video form, on
the six-inch screen of their phone, a video plays of you engaging in salacious
acts with another person who is clearly not your significant other. The video
is crisp, clear, and undoubtedly looks, acts, and talks like you. But is it me?
Thank you to Barry University School of Law and Professor Mitchell Frank for his
sponsorship, encouragement, support, and enthusiasm in teaching evidence to law students.
ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, MEMORY: SURPRISING NEW INSIGHTS INTO HOW WE REMEMBER
AND WHY WE FORGET 169 (1980).
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You then realize that the confidence you held minutes ago in your own
candor is useless. Somehow, someway, there is video proof of you
committing an act you are positive you did not do. Was I drugged? Did I
blackout and not remember my actions? Your brain is trying to
comprehend and protect itself from the trauma and deceit presented to it,
but you realize that this video—this horrifying, false, and life-changing video
is real, at least to the beholder. You know that the video bears a resemblance
to your likeness, but you also know it is not real.
Nevertheless, the video is real, and that is all your significant other
needs to know. The damage is done, and now it appears there is irrefutable
proof you have committed the abominable act of adultery that you know
you did not do. You begin to question your own reality and the world
around you. If this false video exists but appears to be genuine in every way,
what else in our world is simply a distortion of the truth? What other forms
of false media dwell in the world that will swindle and deceive even the most
intelligent minds?
This Article explains deepfake technology and reviews deepfakes in
modern society. 3 Next, this Article discusses the evidentiary implications of
deepfakes and how they are analyzed and authenticated within the
courtroom. 4 Finally, this Article discusses potential methods of combatting
deepfakes, their effect on the courtroom, and prospective avenues of
redress for deepfake victims. 5
II.

WHAT IS A DEEPFAKE?

The disturbing anecdote above is an example of a person procuring
and exploiting what is known to be a “deepfake.” 6 This example, although
life-altering and ultimately distressing, is trivial and uneventful in
comparison to the damage that could be done with this technology, which
will further be explored after identifying and explaining the technology itself.
Deepfakes are videos, images, or other media that have been manipulated
to appear as if the subject of the medium is speaking or partaking in an
action that they did not actually undertake. 7 Cleverly named, the word
deepfake stems from a portmanteau combination of “deep learning” and
3
4
5
6

See infra Part II and III.
See infra Part IV, V, and VI.
See infra Part VII, VIII, IX and X.
See Words We’re Watching: ‘Deepfake,’ MERRIAM WEBSTER (Apr. 2020),

https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/deepfake-slang-definition-examples
[https://perma.cc/BER4-E8JN]; Daniella Scott, Deepfake Porn Nearly Ruined My Life,
ELLE (June 2, 2020), https://www.elle.com/uk/life-and-culture/a30748079/deepfake-porn/
[https://perma.cc/SC48-Q5MN].
Benjamin Goggin, From Porn to ‘Game of Thrones’: How Deepfakes and RealisticLooking Fake Videos Hit It Big, BUS. INSIDER (June 23, 2019, 10:45 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/deepfakes-explained-the-rise-of-fake-realistic-videosonline-2019-6 [https://perma.cc/XY6M-TUZK].
7
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“fake.” 8 Deepfakes, which are hyper realistic, are the result of artificial
intelligence applications that are able to create a new video or audio clip
based on an amalgam of technology. This includes superimposing, altering,
and merging images together to create a sophisticated and believable video. 9
Deepfake technology is relatively new as the technological mechanisms
for creating the content are young and developing; but, despite its infancy,
deepfakes have already infiltrated the world around us. While currently the
most prevalent use of deepfakes to date has been in the pornographic film
industry, 10 the world has already seen deepfakes influence the political
realm, social media, and education. 11 The ever-growing list of possible
implications for the technology is overwhelming. 12
Deepfakes are synthesized when the video creator takes an image or
likeness of one person’s face and subsequently replaces it with another face
or body using an artificially intelligent facial recognition algorithm. 13
Deepfakes rely on deep learning, which is a “subfield of machine learning
concerned with algorithms inspired by the structure and function of the
brain called artificial neuron networks.” 14 Deepfakes are generally
synthesized in two ways. 15

Tom Taulli, Deepfake: What You Need to Know, FORBES (June 15, 2019, 1:02 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomtaulli/2019/06/15/deepfake-what-you-need-to-know/
[https://perma.cc/A982-K5S2].
Id.; see also Goggin, supra note 7.
Karen Hao, Deepfake Porn is Ruining Women’s Lives. Now the Law May Finally Ban It.,
MIT
TECH.
REV.
(Feb.
12,
2021),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/02/12/1018222/deepfake-revenge-porn-comingban/ [https://perma.cc/PV9M-CKCH] (“While deepfakes have received enormous attention
for their potential political dangers, the vast majority of them are used to target women.
Sensity AI, a research company that has tracked online deepfake videos since December of
2018, has consistently found that between 90% and 95% of them are nonconsensual porn.”).
Kristen Dold, Face-Swapping Porn: How a Creepy Internet Trend Could Threaten
Democracy,
ROLLING
STONE
(Apr.
17,
2018,
8:47
PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/face-swapping-porn-how-acreepy-internet-trend-could-threaten-democracy-629275/ [https://perma.cc/AS7F-TQDB];
Damon Beres & Marcus Gilmer, A Guide to ‘Deepfakes,’ the Internet’s Latest Moral Crisis,
MASHABLE
(Feb.
2,
2018),
https://mashable.com/2018/02/02/what-aredeepfakes/#FPVRcf.91qqM [https://perma.cc/KE23-4RNE]; Yes, Positive Deepfake
Examples Exist, THINK AUTOMATION, https://www.thinkautomation.com/bots-and-ai/yespositive-deepfake-examples-exist/ [https://perma.cc/VR2Y-HT6P].
Beres & Gilmer, supra note 11.
Meredith Somers, Deepfakes, Explained, MIT MGMT. SLOAN SCH. (July 21, 2020),
https://mitsloan.mit.edu/ideas-made-to-matter/deepfakes-explained
[https://perma.cc/G2EP-DVXJ].
Raina Davis, Chris Wiggins & Joan Donovan, Deepfakes, HARV. KENNEDY SCH. BELFER
CTR.
FOR
SCI.
AND
INT’L
AFF.
3,
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/Deepfakes_2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2AY8-KM47].
8
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See id.
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The first method utilizes generative adversarial networks (“GANs”). 16
A pair of GANs are used in which one GAN network “inputs a latent sample
and generates an image.” 17 Then, in simplified terms, the output created
from the first network is fed into a second network that identifies the image
as genuine or fake. 18 The network continually provides feedback to itself,
rating the image on a probability scale weighing the authenticity of the image
while constantly adjusting the image until the computer itself can no longer
determine the difference between the original input image and the new
deepfake that has emerged. 19
The alternative method of creating a deepfake involves utilizing deep
learning computers called variational auto-encoders (“VAEs”). 20 VAEs
include two networks working together that are trained and programmed to
encode an image into a low-dimensional representation and then
subsequently decode the representation back into an image. 21 The decoder
houses hundreds of images of a desired celebrity or public figure that are
continuously configured until the input and output images match. 22 The
decoder then acts analogous to an artist, and it can add additional features
like hats, sunglasses, or accessories. 23 In other words, if the objective was to
create a realistic looking video of the late former President George
Washington riding a Segway, one encoder would be trained and
programmed to identify images of George Washington’s face while the
other would be trained on a wide variety of alternative faces. 24 The images
of the faces identified by the encoder can be curated to create different
frames, poses, and lighting. 25 Once the encoder network training is
complete, the output from both encoders are combined, resulting in George
Washington’s face on someone else’s body; that body just happens to be
riding a Segway or partaking in another humorous, sensational, or
malevolent act. 26
Obviously, since George Washington has passed, it would be quite

16
17

Id.
Id.

Naoki Shibuya, Understanding Generative Adversarial Networks, MEDIUM (Nov. 2, 2017),
https://medium.com/activating-robotic-minds/understanding-generative-adversarialnetworks-4dafc963f2ef [https://perma.cc/MF2L-3XBX].
18

19
20

Id.
Artificial Intelligence: GANs and Autoencoders Applied to CyberSecurity, ELEVEN PATHS

10
(May
30,
2019),
https://pro-cdo-web-resources.s3.eu-west1.amazonaws.com/elevenpaths/uploads/2020/6/elevenpaths-whitepaper-artificialintelligence-gans-and-autoencoders-applied-to-cybersecurity.pdf [https://perma.cc/EHA5FYR5].
Davis, et al., supra note 14.
21
22
23

Id.
Id.

24

Somers, supra note 13.

25

Id.
Id.

26
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easy to identify the video as fake. 27 However, in general, deepfakes can be
quite difficult to identify as inauthentic because they generally use genuine
footage, crisp audio, and are popularly shared to hundreds of thousands, if
not millions of people via social networks such as Twitter, Facebook,
Instagram, and the newly prevalent TikTok. 28 Additionally, with the
mainstream prevalence of “fake news,” 29 deepfakes will most likely only fuel
the fake news fire by allowing users to provide misleading information in a
variety of convincing ways. 30
Deepfakes have the potential to affect unlimited facets of our daily lives
including personal relationships, education and professional opportunities,
the political realm, and the legal field. In some aspect, their use may create
positive applications for an efficient and edified life, which will be discussed
later. 31 However, their mere existence could lead to a bleak outcome if the
population is ill-informed as to their existence. The legal field in particular
must understand deepfakes’ potential harm and unethical behavior that
stems from them.
III.

THE SOCIAL WORLD AND DEEPFAKES

Deepfakes, whether you realize it or not, are already a significant
component of our social lives because their use increases daily in social
media, art, politics, and more. 32 Aside from the troubling sexualization
aspects of deepfake technology, Hollywood, social media, and the political
realm alike have employed deepfakes for entertainment, education, and
experimentation. 33 When used improperly, deepfakes can have a damaging
Blanton, Wyndham, The Death of George Washington, GEORGE WASHINGTON’S
MOUNT
VERNON,
https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digitalencyclopedia/article/the-death-of-george-washington/ [https://perma.cc/V2AA-7WTW].
Mika Westerlund, The Emergence of Deepfake Technology: A Review, 9 TECH.
INNOVATION MGMT. REV. 11, 40 (Nov. 2019), https://timreview.ca/article/1282
[https://perma.cc/Q4B6-H27C].
What
is
Fake
News?,
GOODWILL
CMTY.
FOUND.,
https://edu.gcfglobal.org/en/thenow/what-is-fake-news/1/ [https://perma.cc/2LEW-U8EN].
Oscar Schwartz, You Thought Fake News Was Bad? Deep Fakes Are Where Truth Goes
to
Die,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
12,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/nov/12/deep-fakes-fake-news-truth
[https://perma.cc/T6UY-9YEV].
Yisroel Mirsky & Wenke Lee, The Creation and Detection of Deepfakes: A Survey, 1
ACM COMPUT. SURV. 1 (Jan. 2020), https://arxiv.org/pdf/2004.11138.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7MGQ-46ZH].
See John Brandon, There Are Now 15,000 Deepfake Videos on Social Media. Yes, You
Should
Worry.,
FORBES
(Oct.
8,
2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnbbrandon/2019/10/08/there-are-now-15000-deepfakevideos-on-social-media-yes-you-should-worry/?sh=1691fdc23750 [https://perma.cc/5PDQKL6E].
Jeremy Kahn, Forget Disinformation. It’s Hollywood and Madison Avenue Where
Deepfakes Are About to Wreak Havoc, FORTUNE (June 22, 2021),
27

28

29

30

31

32

33
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effect. 34 However, examples of positive uses of deepfakes and their
technology have already emerged. 35
Deepfake technology has wide potential for developments in
education and social change. In 2018, the Illinois Holocaust Museum and
Education Center launched an exhibit in which museum patrons could
interact with hologrammatic interviews of Holocaust survivors by asking
them questions and hearing their stories. 36 Similarly, a tech company
resurrected the late John F. Kennedy’s voice and used artificial intelligence
(“AI”) deepfake technology to allow his “voice” to deliver the speech he
would have delivered, if not for his assassination. 37 Finally, deepfake
technology can assist in conquering language barriers. 38 In a public service
announcement advocating for awareness and finding a cure for malaria,
deepfake AI technology was used to make David Beckham speak multiple
languages in order to spread the advantageous message to various countries
in their native languages. 39
In a less enriching example, the late Carrie Fisher was brought back to
life using deepfake technology to reprise her role as Princess Leia in the
latest Star Wars film. 40 Most notably in late 2021, multiple deepfakes of
famous action star Tom Cruise have been making rounds on social media
sites like TikTok and Facebook. 41 Staying true to a hallmark of deepfakes
in that the subject is often partaking in uncharacteristic actions, the AI
Cruise is seen performing a magic trick, eating a lollipop, and singing a
song. 42 Referring to the Tom Cruise deepfakes, Hany Farid, a professor at
the University of California, Berkeley, told National Public Radio that “this

https://fortune.com/2021/06/22/deepfakes-tom-cruise-chris-ume-metaphysic-hollywoodmadison-avenue-eye-on-ai/ [https://perma.cc/QRY3-RPPN]; Brandon, supra note 32;
Leonie Bos, Deepfakes Are Jumping from Porn to Politics. It’s Time to Fight Back, WIRED
(Dec.
20,
2020),
https://www.wired.co.uk/article/deepfakes-porn-politics
[https://perma.cc/MW5M-PRLK].
Scott, supra note 6 (“I had spent my entire adult life watching helplessly as my image was
used against me by men that I had never given permission to of any kind.”).
Ashish Jaiman, Positive Use Cases of Deepfakes, TOWARDS DATA SCI. (Aug. 14, 2020),
https://towardsdatascience.com/positive-use-cases-of-deepfakes-49f510056387
[https://perma.cc/D45V-EGMM].
THINK AUTOMATION, supra note 11.
34

35

36
37
38
39

Id.
Id.
Id.

Joseph Foley, 14 Deepfake Examples That Terrified and Amused the Internet, CREATIVE
BLOQ (June 1, 2021), https://www.creativebloq.com/features/deepfake-examples
[https://perma.cc/WH3E-RM9P].
Rachel Metz, How a Deepfake Tom Cruise on TikTok Turned into a Very Real AI
Company, CNN BUS. (Aug. 6, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/08/06/tech/tom-cruisedeepfake-tiktok-company/index.html [https://perma.cc/5GLT-FJGL].
40

41

42

Id.
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is clearly a new category of deepfake that we have not seen before.” 43 Farid,
who researches digital forensics and misinformation, pronounced that the
Cruise deepfakes demonstrate a “step up” in the technology’s developing
advancement. 44
Although there are numerous positive aspects to the rapidly evolving
technology of deepfakes, their presence unearths a growing concern of their
uses, including fostering an environment that lacks trust along with the
potential for hackers and scammers to exploit vulnerable and naïve citizens.
In response to the Tom Cruise deepfakes, former Central Intelligence
Agency officer and disinformation specialist Matt Ferraro indicated that the
national security and intelligence community in Washington D.C. now
believes we are one step closer to a feared dystopian future. 45 When
referring to the security community, Ferraro prophesied the source of fear
in the community by saying, “It’s because they realize how dangerous
[deepfakes] are. It does seem like it’s really going to be a fundamental
challenge to the information environment.” 46
Moreover, the nightly broadcast of a popular news program may be
shrouded in doubt as deepfake videos of politicians like former Presidents
Barack Obama and Donald Trump are shared, only later found to be
created with deepfake technology. 47 Also, audio deepfakes have already
been used to clone voices and convince people they are speaking to trusted
companions, convincing them to partake in activity they normally would
not. 48 Overall, deepfakes have the potential to erode and undermine our
trust in everyday life. Although they create new opportunities for learning
and education, 49 things will not always be as they seem with the advent and
Emma Bowman, Slick Tom Cruise Deepfakes Signal That Near Flawless Forgeries May
Be Here, NPR (Mar. 11, 2021, 5:47 PM), https://www.npr.org/2021/03/11/975849508/slick43

tom-cruise-deepfakes-signal-that-near-flawless-forgeries-may-be-here
[https://perma.cc/H9KR-EERZ].
44

Id.

Mark Corcoran & Matt Henry, The Tom Cruise Deepfake that Set Off ‘Terror’ in the
Heart of Washington DC, ABC NEWS AUSTL. (June 27, 2021, 7:16 PM),
45

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-06-24/tom-cruise-deepfake-chris-ume-securitywashington-dc/100234772 [https://perma.cc/XLM9-5JV3].
46

Id.

Kaylee Fagan, A Viral Video that Appeared to Show Obama Calling Trump a ‘Dips--‘Shows a Disturbing New Trend Called ‘Deepfakes,’ INSIDER (Apr. 17, 2018, 3:48 PM),
47

https://www.businessinsider.com/obama-deepfake-video-insulting-trump-2018-4
[https://perma.cc/GG3A-8E5K].
Jesse Damiani, A Voice Deepfake Was Used to Scam a CEO Out of $243,000, FORBES
(Sept. 3, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jessedamiani/2019/09/03/a-voice-deepfakewas-used-to-scam-a-ceo-out-of-243000/?sh=62d555282241 [https://perma.cc/S5XF-A3V5].
Matthew Griffin, Edtech Company Udacity Uses Deepfake Tech to Create Educational
Videos
Automatically,
FANATICAL
FUTURIST
(Aug.
2,
2019),
https://www.fanaticalfuturist.com/2019/08/edtech-company-udacity-uses-deepfake-tech-tocreate-educational-videos-automatically/
[https://perma.cc/AD3V-Z5BC]
(“Producing
48

49
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ease of using deepfake technology.
IV.

THE EVOLUTION OF EVIDENCE

Indubitably, the courtroom and legal system will be meaningfully
affected by deepfake technology. The most glaring application of deepfake
technology to the legal system is its entry in generating unrest and
inconsistency in the accusation of crime, dispute settlements, and the
courtroom itself, including Daubert hearings on evidence, which will be
discussed further on. 50 Prior to the prevalence of text messages, videos, and
emails, eyewitness accounts were the pinnacle of evidentiary support, often
decimating the high and mighty jury from its pre-conceived notions of the
case at hand, forcing it to consider alternatives to its gut theory. 51
In the early eighteenth century, the preferred method of evidence
proffered to the court was written. 52 Written proof was favored over oral
testimony because at this time, oral or unwritten evidence that was submitted
became entangled with numerous criteria that are not present today,
including religious disabilities, lack of discernment, incompetency, conflicts
of interest, or blatant inability to testify for a variety of causes. 53 However, in
1755, written testimony was often shrouded in confusion and conflict, while
oral testimony appeared to follow with less controversy. 54 This may be due
to the fact that hearsay restrictions, when present, were almost never
regulated while expert testimony parameters were extremely loose in
comparison to the rigid standards of today. 55
In the late nineteenth century and early into the twentieth century, the
reign of oral evidence continued. 56 Documents were considered unreliable
and confusing to the jury. 57 In an early treatise on evidence, Thomas Starkie,
who is considered a founder of the modern evidentiary argument, stated:
Oral testimony, it is to be remarked, in natural order precedes
content for Massive Open Online Course (MOOC) platforms like Coursera and EdX might
be academically rewarding, and potentially lucrative, but it’s also hugely time consuming –
particularly where videos are involved, so Udacity, in an ode to Soul Machines who recently
created 'Will' the world’s first avatar teacher who’s already taught over 250,000 children
about energy, have been looking into ways to get Artificial Intelligence (AI) to produce the
videos automatically for them – something that would be a game changer in the academic
world.”).
See infra Part VIII.
See John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View from the
Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168 (1996) (explaining how dependence on witness
testimony shaped evidentiary law).
Id. at 1183.
Id. at 1194–95.
Thomas P. Gallanis, The Rise of Modern Evidence Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 499, 530 (1999).
Id. at 513.
See id. at 529.
See id. (noting oral evidence was more common than written evidence in criminal trials
during the early 1820s).
50
51

52
53
54
55
56
57
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written evidence. It is in general more proximate to the fact than
written evidence, being a direct communication by one who possesses actual
knowledge of the fact by his senses; whilst written evidence in itself requires
proof, and must ultimately be derived from the same source with
oral evidence, that is, from those who possessed actual knowledge of the
facts. 58
However, as the realm of evidence continued to evolve, empirical
research about the topic of oral testimony and in particular, memory,
commenced. 59 With that, reservations about the reliability of oral testimony
started breaching the evidentiary surface. 60
As an example, in 1901 in Berlin, a criminal law professor was
unremarkably lecturing to his law students when abruptly, a student shouted
an objection to his line of argument. 61 In response, an angered student
hurled corrosive insults, and a heated altercation began between the
students. 62 Finally, the valiant professor intervened and calmed the situation
down. 63 Little did the audience of scared law students know, the entire scene
was a staged exercise procured to test the strength and vigor of their
recollection of the events. 64 Not surprisingly, the results were abysmal with
the most student witnesses recalling twenty-five to eighty percent of the
significant details wrong. 65 Pivotal moments in the scene were completely
wiped away from the students’ memories while others described events that
only took place in their lucid imaginations. 66
In a subsequent 1932 study, Sir Frederic Charles Bartlett conducted
an experiment now known as “The War of the Ghosts.” 67 This study
demonstrated the fragile nature of memory by assigning English participants
to read and remember a Canadian Indian Folklore story. 68 When instructed
to recount portions of the folklore, the English participants’ recollection was
skewed; readers often replaced unfamiliar or culturally different

THOMAS STARKIE, GEORGE MORLEY DOWDESWELL & JOHN GEORGE
MALCOLM, PRACTICAL TREATISE OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 103 (8th American ed.,
Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1860).
See generally Alice M. Hoffman & Howard S. Hoffman, Reliability and Validity in Oral
History: The Case for Memory, in MEMORY AND HISTORY: ESSAYS ON RECALLING AND
INTERPRETING EXPERIENCE 107, 108 (Glenace E. Edwall & Jaclyn Jeffrey eds., 1994).
58

59

60
61

See generally id.
Atul Gawande, Investigations Under Suspicion: The Fugitive Science of Criminal Justice,

NEW YORKER, Jan. 8, 2011, at 50.
62
63
64
65
66

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Harald Sack, Frederic Bartlett and Experimental Psychology, SCIHI BLOG (Oct. 20, 2016),
http://scihi.org/frederic-bartlett-and-experimental-psychology/
[https://perma.cc/45SWFUSW].
67

68

Id.
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information with something more familiar. 69 For instance, participants
changed a mentioned activity of seal hunting to fishing, and the use of canoes
to regular boats. 70 The readers also postulated multiple inferences pertaining
to the story that went beyond the scope of the information originally
provided in the tale. 71 The ever-evolving distrust in oral witness testimony
paves a clear and relatively unobstructed path for reliance and confidence
in video forms of evidence, particularly in the courtroom.
V.

DEEPFAKES AND THE COURT SYSTEM

Shifting abruptly to our current era, the technology landscape we live
in is rapidly expanding due to the availability and ease of using portable and
potent video and audio capturing technology, like police body cameras,
smart phones, and dashboard recording devices. Even prior to the new age
in technology, legal commentators have noted that it is “both reasonable and
necessary for the legal profession to improve its procedures by taking
advantage of important new technologies such as videotape.” 72 The court
system has widely adopted the use of technological evidence, and the vast
increase in the quality and quantity of digital evidence has been a challenge
for the court system in terms of receiving, authenticating, and presenting
video evidence to the court. 73 Now, with the mass influx of new technology
and the rise of deepfakes, the court system is presented with new challenges
that may once have never been pondered. 74 Obviously, the main
remonstrance today focuses on the identification of altered and fraudulent
deepfake videos as well as stopping them in their tracks before the use of
them in a legal proceeding radically alters the outcome. 75
“To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of
evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a

William F. Brewer, Learning Theory Schema Theory, EDUC. ENCYCLOPEDIA,
https://education.stateuniversity.com/pages/2175/Learning-Theory-SCHEMATHEORY.html [https://perma.cc/9ULQ-CB6A].
Bartlett’s
‘War
of
the
Ghosts’,
PSYCHOLOGY
GCSE,
https://sites.google.com/view/gcsepsychology/cognition-and-behaviour/bartletts-war-of-theghosts [https://perma.cc/Y63H-EV9T].
69

70

71

Id.

44 AM. JURIS. TRIALS 171 (originally published in 1992).
See JOINT TECH. COMM., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., JTC RESOURCE BULLETIN:
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(2016),
https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/18521/digital-evidence-3-14-2016-final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/44SY-DT8W].
Matt Reynolds, Courts and Lawyers Struggle with Growing Prevalence of Deepfakes,
A.B.A. J. (June 9, 2020), https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/courts-and-lawyersstruggle-with-growing-prevalence-of-deepfakes [https://perma.cc/TW29-T33A].
See Esquire Deposition Solutions, LLC, Protecting Legal Proceedings from Deepfake
Technology, JD SUPRA (Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/protecting-legalproceedings-from-90642/ [https://perma.cc/FKF7-Q92J].
72
73

74

75

219

220

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 48:1

finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” 76 Specifically, for
photographs and videos, either party can authenticate the visual depiction
as a “fair and accurate representation of the underlying scene at the relevant
time.” 77 However, courts have inferred that the bar for authentication of
evidence is “not particularly high,” and the Federal Rule of Evidence for
authentication of video only requires that a reasonable jury could find in
favor of authenticating the visual. 78 In other words, the jury will ultimately
decide if the visual is what it purports to be, but the initial threshold of
admitting it is not a difficult hurdle to overcome. 79
Federal Rule of Evidence 902(13) calls for authentication of records
“generated by an electronic process or system that produces an accurate
result” if “shown by a certification of a qualified person” in a particular way. 80
However, due to the sheer, real quality of the videos, witnesses or
proponents of the video could have been psychologically deceived or fooled
into believing the reality of the video. 81 In more pessimistic terms, the socalled qualified person testifying that the video is what it says to be could
simply be lying. 82 It is important to note that based on the Federal Rules of
Evidence, just because a video or visual is admissible under authentication
scrutiny does not mean it is automatically admissible. 83 The purported
evidence may still be deemed inadmissible under any of the other applicable
Federal Rules of Evidence if it does not meet the additional requirements
of that specific rule. 84
VI.

THE
COURTROOM
AUTHENTICATION

AND

EVIDENCE

Throughout the years, various court holdings have demonstrated that
in terms of evidence authentication and admissibility, there is a relatively

FED. R. EVID. 901.
DEBORAH JONES MERRITT & RIC SIMMONS, LEARNING EVIDENCE: FROM THE FEDERAL
RULES OF THE COURTROOM, 919–24 (4th ed. 2018).
FED. R. EVID. 901(a); see United States v. Vayner, 769 F.3d 125, 130 (2d Cir. 2014) (“The
ultimate determination as to whether the evidence is, in fact, what its proponent claims is
thereafter a matter for the jury.”).
United States v. Gammal, No. 19-468, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 33913, at *2–3 (2d Cir. Oct.
26, 2020).
FED. R. EVID. 902(13); see Theodore F. Claypoole, AI and Evidence: Let’s Start to Worry,
NAT. L. REV. (Nov. 14, 2019),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/ai-and-evidence-let-s-start-to-worry
[https://perma.cc/W93F-BFDY].
See Claypoole, supra note 80.
76
77

78

79

80

81

Id.
See Richards v. McClure, 858 N.W.2d 841, 849 (Neb. 2015) (citing 29A AM. JUR. 2D
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low threshold. 85 Specifically, this perception rings true when a witness or
party can purportedly identify and confirm that an evidentiary image or
video is accurate. 86 Back in 1985, in a case when no well-founded accusation
of inaccuracy was made, the simple testimony of an investigator that a
videotape showed accurate depictions of an event tantamount to the trial
was sufficient for video authentication purposes. 87
In a 2010 California appellate court decision, although no expert
testified that a photograph was “composite” or “faked,” the court ruled the
prosecutor should not have admitted a Myspace photo claiming to show the
girlfriend of a defendant flashing a gang sign because the photo had not been
authenticated. 88 Although the court ruled the error did not cause harm to
the defendants, the court mentioned that with the “advent of computer
software programs such as Adobe Photoshop, ‘it does not always take skill,
experience, or even cognizance to alter a digital photo.’” 89 In 2016, DVD
recordings containing surveillance footage were properly authenticated by a
witness who had knowledge of the company and understood how the system
worked, including the display of the date and time on the footage. 90
More recently in 2021, an appellate court considered the challenges of
evidence brought about by new technology by stating, “[W]e are mindful
that in the age of fake social-media accounts, hacked accounts, and so-called
deepfakes, a trial court faced with the question whether a social-media
account is authentic must itself be mindful of these concerns.” 91 In this case,
the court’s decision to admit evidence was questioned on appeal regarding
the authentication of Facebook posts. 92 An intended person had made ill
and malicious remarks during a Facebook Live video, so as revenge, the
defendant shot a person he believed to be the curator of the Facebook Live
video. 93 In its reasoning, the court noted concerns about fake social media
accounts but conditionally authenticated proffered social media evidence
with the option for objection by an opponent if further evidence of

85

See infra notes 86–90.

George L. Blum, Annotation, Authentication of Social Media Records and
Communications, 40 A.L.R. 7th Art. 1 (2019) (citing State v. Patterson, No. C-170329, 2018
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WL 4026476, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2018)) (testimony that victim saw defendant's
photograph on Facebook was sufficient to meet the low threshold required to authenticate
the photograph).
Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Spencer Handbags Corp., 765 F.2d 966, 974 (2d Cir. 1985).
People v. Beckley, 185 Cal. App. 4th 509, 515 (2010).
Id. (quoting Zachariah B. Parry, Digital Manipulation and Photographic Evidence:
Defrauding the Courts One Thousand Words at a Time, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y
175, 183 (2009)).
United States v. Kessinger, No. 15-5364, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 2408, at *11 (6th Cir.
Feb. 9, 2016).
People v. Smith, No. 346044, 2021 Mich. App. LEXIS 1144, at *34 (Ct. App. Feb. 18,
2021).
Id. at *2.
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deception arose. 94 However, the court opined that the decision in this case
“does not discount the possibility that evidence from social media, might in
fact, be inaccurate, hacked, or faked. As technology advances, trial courts
and lawyers will need to be vigilant when considering questions of
authenticity, at both the first and second stages.” 95
Alternatively, in 2015, a separate California jurisdiction disagreed with
Beckley in which the court articulated that the foundation for a photograph
or video “‘may be supplied by other witness testimony, circumstantial
evidence, content and location’ and ‘may also be established “by any other
means provided by law” including a statutory presumption.’” 96 The court
stated that “reading Beckley as equating authentication with proving
genuineness would ignore a fundamental principle underlying
authentication.” 97 This principle is that the ultimate determination of
authenticity of evidence is for the trier of fact. 98 The trier of fact is in the
position to consider the evidence presented to them and weigh it against any
inconsistencies to eventually arrive at a final determination on authenticity. 99
Likewise, when a plaintiff could not detail how a video was made or if it had
been altered, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals did not allow the
evidence to be authenticated. 100 In doing so, the court properly mirrored the
California Court of Appeals in identifying fraudulent material. 101
An appellate court in 2019 held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting a voicemail professedly left by defendant for the
murder victim. 102 In Gonzales, the court looked to the rulings of many
jurisdictions and adopted a flexible approach to authenticating video and
photo recordings. 103 However, the court noted that computer technology
and software are in general public use, and most owners of a computer have
the requisite knowledge and programs to potentially tamper with
recordings. 104 Despite the court’s awareness of the potential for deception, it
reasoned that the possibility alone is not enough to postulate narrow and
restrictive rules for authentication that must be applied in every case,
specifically if there is no corroborative reason to do so. 105
The Colorado Court of Appeals in Gonzales, like other jurisdictions,

94
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Id. at *35.
Id. at *38.
In re K.B., 238 Cal. App. 4th 989, 995 (2015) (quoting People v. Goldsmith, 59 Cal. 4th

258, 268 (2014)) (citations omitted).
Id. at 997.
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looked to People v. Sangster for guidance. 106 In Sangster, the state sought to
introduce evidence of a telephone call apparently made by the defendant
from jail to an unnamed female. 107 The defendant in this case was allegedly
using the jail telephone system to contact potential witnesses in his
upcoming case with the intent to coerce or threaten them into
absenteeism. 108 When inmates entered the population of this jail, they were
registered into the jail’s telephone system. 109 The system consisted of a voice
recognition component coupled with the use of a personal identification
number. 110 When an inmate attempted to make a call, they were required to
provide their personal identification number and audibly state their name. 111
If the inmate’s voice corresponded to their previously recorded voice, the
call was dispatched. 112 However, if the voice associated with the specific
personal identification number did not match, the call would disconnect. 113
The defendant’s claim that the phone call evidence was improperly
admitted fell short. 114 In this First District Court of Appeals case in Illinois,
the court posited that when a defendant does “not present any actual
evidence of tampering, substitution, or contamination, the State need only
establish a probability that those things did not occur.” 115 As many skilled
trial lawyers often opine, “any deficiencies go to the weight, rather than the
admissibility, of the evidence.” 116
Similarly, again citing Sangster, earlier on in 2020, a defendant’s
argument failed when the defendant argued that “improperly-authenticated
recordings are inherently suspect in this age of deep-fake videos and easilymanipulated audio records.” 117 In this case, the court paralleled the Sangster
reasoning and postulated that unless there is apparent evidence of
tampering or manipulation, there may not be foundational issues with the
evidence presented. 118
Clearly infiltrating the United States’ court system, deepfakes also have
a global reach in worldwide courts. In an ongoing United Kingdom child
custody battle, a wife submitted into evidence a heavily doctored audio
recording of the children’s father in which the father was making violent and
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malicious threats towards his wife and children. 119 Luckily, experts were able
to identify the manipulated recording. 120 However, the doctored clip in this
case was a less sophisticated version of deepfake AI videos and is suitably
called “cheapfake” technology. 121 Mr. James, a partner in the London-based
law firm Expatriate Law, suggested that “it would never occur to most judges
that deepfake material could be submitted as evidence.” 122
These global cases appear to show that some courts are in fact aware
of the existence and potential issues caused by deepfake technology.
However, as demonstrated in the various approaches to authenticating
evidence throughout United States’ jurisdictions, there is unconcealed
leniency in authenticating evidence unless it can be proved that there is
reason to believe of foul play in modifying or editing an auditory or visual
piece of evidence. 123 The prevalence of deepfakes results in the need for a
call to action for all participants in the legal community to acknowledge the
threat, educate themselves on methods of detection, and advocate for others
to become aware of the impending technological threat. Deepfakes have the
potential to cause an extreme erosion of trust in the public perception of
the courtroom. 124
VII.

COMBATTING DEEPFAKES

In order to deter the use of deepfake technology, proponents of all
facets in the legal community need to be educated and aware of this issue
and recognize that additional resources and investments may be needed to
properly battle their infiltration into the legal system. 125 For instance, if a
client is pushing evidence upon a lawyer with suspect motives, it may be a
red flag that the evidence is less than authentic. Additionally, training in
spotting outward signs of altered deepfake technology can be a basic, but
needed, starting point in weeding out the malignant deepfake tumors in the
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See Reynolds, supra note 74.
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Id.
Patrick Ryan, ‘Deepfake’ Audio Evidence Used in UK Court to Discredit Dubai Dad,

NAT’L NEWS: UAE (Feb. 8, 2020), https://www.thenationalnews.com/uae/courts/deepfakeaudio-evidence-used-in-uk-court-to-discredit-dubai-dad-1.975764 [https://perma.cc/Y9EUHAG4].
See generally supra Part VI.
Cf. Kelsey Farish, The Legal Implications and Challenges of Deepfakes, DAC
BEACHCROFT
(Sept.
4,
2020),
https://www.dacbeachcroft.com/en/gb/articles/2020/september/the-legal-implications-andchallenges-of-deepfakes/ [https://perma.cc/QD8Z-M8JX] (briefly observing deepfakes can
be used in creating fraudulent submissions of documentary evidence while providing
examples in which deepfakes present risks to various aspects of our socio-political system).
See People v. Smith, No. 346044, 2021 Mich. App. LEXIS 1144, at *38 (Mich. Ct. App.
Feb. 18, 2021), appeal denied, 962 N.W.2d 277 (Mich. 2021).
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court system. 126 Overall, countermeasures throughout the legal system need
to be enacted to detect and prevent the use of mischievous deepfake
technology. 127
In some jurisdictions, courts continue to rely on less sophisticated
methods of identification as a first and minor step in identifying these
manipulated videos when technological methods may not be easily
accessible. 128 This includes using a totality of the circumstances approach in
examining if the actions, words, and mannerisms of the supposed individual
on video is acting in accordance with their known personality. 129
Additionally, less complex identification methods include gauging promises
or comments made by a deepfake video and simply seeing if those
promises, threats, or concerns come to fruition. 130 For example, an executive
in the United Kingdom was shown a video of his chief executive officer
requesting a wire transfer to an unknown account in a large sum of money. 131
The executive only learned of the deceit because the reimbursement of the
transferred funds promised by the CEO never came. 132 Although utilizing
the notions of common sense and caution are useful tactics, as deepfakes
become more prevalent in society and the courtroom, technology involving
their detection will become indispensable in a courtroom scenario. 133
The easiest, albeit not the most advanced, technological solution to
detecting deepfakes is to conduct a reverse-image search. 134 “Reverse image
search is a search engine technology that takes an image file as input query
and returns results related to the image.” 135 Search engines like Google allow
a user to navigate to the search image page and upload an image from the

Cf. id. at 34–39 (advocating for deepfake detection education and training as a starting
point for alleviating potential courtroom-based manipulation based on the suggestion that
trial courts need to be mindful of concerns surrounding fake social media and deepfakes).
Mirsky & Lee, supra note 31, at 1:26–28.
Christy Foster, Deepfake Evidence – What It Is and How to Spot It, LEXOLOGY (Feb. 13,
2020),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=be75a3a5-595b-4dc8-ac4e7e6f0523257f [https://perma.cc/H5NC-KM7S] (noting that although rare, members of the
legal community need to be apprised of deepfakes in the legal field as technology continues
to improve).
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for deepfakes and as technology continues to improve, legal advisors and litigants alike
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Nicholas Schmidt, Privacy Law and Resolving ‘Deepfakes’ Online, IAPP (Jan. 30, 2019),
https://iapp.org/news/a/privacy-law-and-resolving-deepfakes-online/ [https://perma.cc/7JKYRVG4].
Ivy Wigmore, Reverse Image Search, TECH TARGET (Apr. 2013),
https://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/reverse-image-search
[https://perma.cc/N2LUQX4L].
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user’s computer or a specific URL link. 136 From there, the search engine will
scour the internet to assist in locating the source for an image, searching for
duplicated content, debunking faked images, and ensuring compliance with
copyright regulations. 137 Using this technique, if a deepfake was created by
another image or video already located somewhere on the internet, the
original version should appear in the reverse image search. 138
In a more abstract detection method, deepfakes are potentially spotted
by a scrupulous study of the image employing the “uncanny valley”
method. 139 First coined in the 1970s when a Japanese roboticist Masahiro
Mori conducted an experiment using a lifelike robot, the “uncanny valley”
hypothesis asserts that when humans are faced with images, videos, or even
the physical presence of an artificial figure, the human appearance and
behavior of the entity can make a spectator believe the entity is human. 140
However, “the sense of viewer familiarity drops into an ‘uncanny valley’
once the artificial figure tries but fails to mimic a realistic human.” 141
Since empirical data is inconsistent on the issue, the “uncanny valley”
hypothesis is currently still open to debate, but it appears to gather support
from evolutionary, social, cognitive, and psychodynamic viewpoints. 142
Because “[d]eepfakes are often assembled by an algorithm from still
photos,” natural human facial expressions and common but unconscious
bodily ticks are often not apparent in the final product, and if they are, they
will not fully translate, seeming odd or strange in comparison to natural
human movement and activity. 143 In short, if following the “uncanny valley”
hypothesis, deepfake videos should evoke a “subconscious feeling of
unease” and deceit, often triggering the viewer to question the validity of the
content. 144
Turning to a drastically more complex detection method for
deepfakes, organizations like the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and
the U.S. Department of Defense are using biometric data to identify
inconsistencies in video data. 145 Biometrics are the unique physical
136
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characteristics of a person, like their fingerprints, that can be measured and
used for automated recognition. 146 One method of employing biometric data
to defeat deepfakes involves iris scanning. 147 An iris, which is made of
connective tissue and smooth muscle fibers within the eye, is responsible
for working in conjunction with the pupil of an eye to regulate light. 148 Thus,
to identify a potential deepfake, a scan of a subject’s iris in a video can reveal
pupil size and dilation. 149 Any deviations from the norm could be cause to
investigate further, potentially exposing a deepfake. 150 In fact, the now
famous Tom Cruise deepfakes were exposed as fraudulent partially because
experts noticed Cruise’s pupils were distorted. 151
Likewise, biometric data can be used to identify deepfake videos when
the blood flow of a subject in a video is analyzed. 152 In reality, actual humans
exhibit similar blood flow and pulse patterns in their cheeks, necks, and
foreheads during a given interval. 153 However, in deepfake videos, since the
video is generally layered using multiple external videos or images, there will
be an inconsistency in the pulse on a subject’s neck in comparison to the
blood flow in their cheeks or forehead. 154
The use of analyzing biometric data is instrumental in identifying
further inconsistencies in deepfake videos. A slight difference in a subject’s
gait, which is their manner and style of walking, 155 or an inconspicuous
difference in a person’s head movements may be the difference between
spotting a deepfake or a grimmer outcome: letting it plummet into the
misinformation chasm that is our current internet accessible world. 156 In fact,
an absence or excess of blinking has proven to be quite effective in detecting
deceptive deepfakes. 157 On average, a healthy adult blinks somewhere
between every two and ten seconds with a single blink taking approximately
MELLON
UNIV.
SOFTWARE
ENG’G.
INST.
(Aug.
22,
2016),
https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/blog/real-time-extraction-of-biometric-data-from-video/
[https://perma.cc/A8EL-QNHP].
Biometrics, U.S. DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/biometrics
[https://perma.cc/HR7E-R95J].
Venneti, supra note 145.
Iris,
HEALTHLINE,
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one-tenth to four-tenths of a second. 158 However, since a deepfake creating
algorithm is programmed to use images of a person in which the subject’s
eyes are open, a deepfake algorithm is not yet sophisticated enough to create
fabricated blinks, leading to potential detection by one trained to look for
the anomaly. 159
As is often apparent in technology, there is currently a deepfake war
between the attackers and defenders, so detection and mitigation are
absolutely necessary as the attackers become more evolved and advanced
in constructing deepfakes. 160 Yet, the scientific community is constantly
formulating innovative technological methods of deepfake detection
including discovery of deepfake data that focuses on artifact generation. 161 In
the world of computer data, an artifact is a data flaw caused by conditions,
equipment, or techniques like software errors, electromagnetic interference,
or miscalculations in algorithms. 162 Artifacts are then further categorized into
digital, visual, compression, noise, statistical, and radar artifacts in which
various flaws like distorted or corrupted images, compression issues, static
noise, or ghost objects within an image result in their specific
categorization. 163
When a deepfake is created, it often generates a flaw in the image or
video materializing itself as an artifact. 164 These flaws may be easily missed
by humans, but can be easily detected using forensic analysis and machine
learning. 165 For instance, when a deepfake video is created, the generated
content is blended with the source content, creating intermingled or blurred
edges in the video frame. 166 Artifacts created when spatial blending is
apparent can be detected when a learning computer is taught to emphasize
these artifacts within the boundaries of a video. 167 Additionally, “[t]he
content of a fake face can be anomalous in context to the rest of the frame.
For example, residuals from the face warping process, lighting, and varying
fidelity can indicate the presence of generated content.” 168
Aside from focusing on specific artifact detection, proponents of
detecting deepfakes have trained deep computer neural networks on
anomaly detection models. 169 Here, a computer model is able to overcome
noise and other distortions by identifying raw, original pixels in an image or
158
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video as opposed to the distorted and modified pixels of a deepfake. 170
However, just as technologically savvy and concerned individuals are using
machine learning to defect deepfakes, hackers and creators of deepfake
content can also evade detection via adversarial machine learning by
constantly modifying and adapting the creation of deepfakes as they become
aware of what detection learning methods are already being used. 171
VIII.

DAUBERT HEARINGS AND DEEPFAKES

As shown, methods for detecting deepfakes can range from
rudimentary to exceedingly complex. In some instances, understanding,
examining, and identifying the relevant evidence at issue pertaining to
deepfakes cannot be done by a layperson. If the authenticity of a video was
in question in a courtroom setting and one party was purporting that the
evidence was a deepfake, a person whose occupation or means of
knowledge is in a specialized field would be required to testify about the
evidence. In situations similar to this, expert witnesses are often employed. 172
By definition:
An “expert witness” is one who can enlighten a jury more than the
average man in the street. A witness can be qualified as an expert if his
knowledge extends beyond or supersedes that of an ordinary witness. An
“expert witness” is one who is shown, either by training or experience, to be
better informed than the hypothetical average juror. An expert witness, by
definition, is any person whose opportunity or means of knowledge in a
specialized art or science is to some degree better than that found in the
average juror or witness. 173
If a party in a lawsuit suspects deepfakes will be used in evidence, it
would be the best course of action to hire and utilize an expert to combat
the video or deepfake evidence or to potentially prove it is not a deepfake
if adversely challenged. However, because this realm of technology is new
and unchartered territory, even finding a supposed expert on deepfakes can
pose a conceivable challenge. 174 As the technology continues to develop and
more citizens are exposed to its potential, it is probable that experts in
identifying deepfakes will materialize.
Considering the field of deepfake experts is needed and emerging, the
next logical legal issue that appears when an expert witness may be used
involves Daubert hearings. Daubert hearings are pre-trial hearings in which
a trial court will determine the admissibility of expert testimony under the
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relevant rule of evidence along with the Daubert factors. 175
In 1993, the Supreme Court announced a new test for determining
the reliability of expert testimony in which the Court stressed that judges, as
opposed to a closed circle of experts, will determine the reliability of expert
testimony. 176 The Daubert decision was based on Federal Rule of Evidence
702, which governs expert testimony. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the
product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably
applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. 177
Additionally, when determining if expert testimony is reliable under
the rule, judges should also consider the non-exclusive Daubert factors
which are: whether the theory or technique being implemented has been
tested, whether the technique or theory has been subject to peer review and
publication, the technique’s error rate, the existence of standards controlling
the technique’s application, and whether the theory or technique has
generally been accepted in the relevant scientific community. 178 Thus, if a
party intends to introduce an expert witness in the dominion of deepfakes,
they should meet the criteria presented by both Federal Rule of Evidence
702 and Daubert.
Within the evidentiary rule, 702 imposes two types of reliability
including that the principles underlying the expert’s approach be reliable
while the application of those same principles to the facts of the case must
be reliable. 179 Considering deepfake technology is already enigmatic to begin
with, properly vetting deepfake experts will become a difficult, tedious, and
troublesome aspect of litigation involving supposed deepfakes. For that
reason, if a party to a lawsuit does attempt to challenge the authenticity of
evidence on the premise that it is a deepfake, a judge will most likely hold a
Daubert hearing based on the Daubert challenge:
Daubert challenges to evidence are routinely raised by a motion in
limine, and may also require an evidentiary hearing, or “Daubert hearing,”
to properly inform the trial judge. . . .[F]ederal court[s] may decide whether
a Daubert challenge is decided upon special briefing or some other
procedure, and has further explained that a common method is a Daubert
hearing, although such a hearing is not specifically mandated. . . . “Decisions
about admissibility under all three rules [Federal Rules 403, 702, and 703]
hinge on factual issues that can be resolved meaningfully only if a court is
175
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adequately informed. . . .” A procedure creating a record of facts, whether
by formal hearing with an opportunity for cross-examination, or argument
on special briefs with attached documents and admitted facts of what the
evidence will show, “creates a record that allows a judge to rule on
admissibility after due consideration.” 180
Sometimes, the result of a Daubert hearing can be dispositive if a
party intends to rely on a particular piece of expert testimony to support a
prima facie element of their case. 181 For instance, if a party’s ability to prove
an element of negligence rests upon a surveillance tape, but the opposing
party asserts it is a doctored deepfake video, a trial judge may rely on the
testimony or opinion of a deepfake technology expert to weigh in on the
authenticity of the video. Moreover, if the expert’s testimony does not
survive the Daubert hearing, the party may lack the necessary evidence
needed to go to trial or if allowed to go to trial, to win the case. 182
Since a judge’s evaluation of scientific or technical evidence can be
time consuming and tedious, judges will often opt for a Daubert hearing in
advance of trial to determine the potential prejudice, reliability, and fit of
the proposed evidence. 183 With that, judges may err on the side of caution
with conservative decision making by being less likely to act in accordance
with new scientific methods or principles. Considering deepfake technology
along with deepfake detection methods are relatively new, a judge may be
hesitant to include testimony relating to the authenticity or fraudulent nature
of a deepfake video. This creates a double-edged sword in which a cautious
or conservative judge may choose to exclude evidence that could prove a
video is an altered deepfake while also potentially excluding evidence
proving that a video or image is real. Since Daubert hearings allow judges to
practice their gatekeeper function, in order to dispose of potential inequities
in the courtroom, judges should become aware of the technology as well as
educate themselves on the threat, use, and detection of these life altering
videos.
IX.

LITIGATION
DEEPFAKES

FOR

VICTIMS

AFFECTED

BY

Although the major legal concern surrounding deepfakes is the
potential introduction of deepfake evidence into the courtroom as
authenticated evidence, the legal realm will also be affected by victims of
deepfake technology seeking legal recourse. In the future, there could be
potential for ample litigation by victims of deepfakes relying on various tort
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and fraud legal theories. 184 In common law jurisdictions, the victim of a
deepfake, in theory, can sue the deepfake’s creator under a privacy tort. 185
The most applicable tort is probably the “false light” theory. A false light
action permits recovery for injuries “caused by publicity that unreasonably
places the plaintiff in a false light before the public.” 186 A claim of this nature
“place[s] a person in a false light even though the facts themselves may not
be defamatory.” 187 As one of the four recognized claims in the area of
invasion of privacy, a person can be liable under this doctrine if they
publicize or share a matter involving another person in a false light where it
would be highly offensive to the reasonable person. 188 Here, “‘the essence
of the claim’ is the falsity of what the publication communicates.” 189
Additionally, if a deepfake is being used to improperly promote a
product or service, the victim or subject of the deepfake may be able to
invoke the misappropriation doctrine. 190 Also a privacy tort,
misappropriation could help the victim recover any profits made from the
commercial use of their image or likeness in addition to any applicable
statutory or punitive damages. 191 This doctrine can even be applied in
tandem with a false light claim where applicable. 192
Similarly, if the deepfake content asserts factually untrue
proclamations, traditional causes of action, like libel or defamation, may
lead to a victim’s victory in court. A victim of deepfake technology may also
employ the legal weapon of intentional infliction of emotional distress,
which stems from defamation or libel. Since deepfakes often portray a
victim in an unusual or erroneous light, a person may be able to meet the
elements of an intentional infliction of emotional distress if they can show:
(1) intentional or reckless conduct; (2) extreme or outrageous conduct; (3)
a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional
distress; and (4) severe emotional distress. 193 These elements are tough to
prove, specifically if the deepfake employs parodical or satirical use of a
person’s image. 194 Under fair use and parody law, if a deepfake imitates a
serious piece of work as a method of criticism and meets the elements of
the doctrine, a deepfake creator may escape liability under the fair use
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section of the Copyright Act. 195
Aside from tortious claims, victims of deepfakes may also be able
to prosecute under criminal laws. Depending on the inception, purpose,
and nature of the deepfake, the subject of a deepfake could potentially bring
a claim under domestic abuse statutes, sexual harassment statutes,
cyberbullying laws, or even cyberstalking. 196 One remedy of law that may be
of particular importance to the subject of a deepfake video is an injunction
against the deepfake itself, which would attempt to remove the deepfake
from the internet altogether and optimistically limit the unintended effects
and reach of the video. 197
X. A TECHNOLOGICAL CALL TO ACTION
Deepfakes, like all technology, will become rapidly and more readily
available to users as the technology continues to advance. As deepfake
detection methods become more commonplace and obtainable, deepfake
originators will be consistently innovating new ways to evade detection and
continue their use of these altered videos, photos, and audio. As a society,
public figures in the education, political, entertainment, and specifically legal
field need to be aware of the risk and threat of deepfakes while presenting
the issues to their respective constituents.
In the realm of social media, major players in the field have announced
policies, although limited, relating to monitoring and policing deepfakes. 198
Facebook said it would remove “manipulated misleading media” which has
been “edited or synthesized” using machine learning if the videos mislead
someone into thinking the subject of the video did or said something they
did not actually partake in. 199 Likewise, Reddit, the major message board
website, said it will remove media that “impersonates individuals or entities
in a misleading or deceptive manner.” 200 While these policies will assist in
removing glaring and obvious depictions of deepfakes, current social media
policies leave room for deepfakes to slide through the cracks and infiltrate
millions of users’ news feeds. 201 To combat this, education and awareness of
so-called “fake news” perpetrated by deepfake technology needs to become
widespread.
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Moving to the courtroom, as education and awareness of deepfakes
grows, the effects on the legal system will be varied. For judges and lawyers
alike, advocates within the legal system need to be armed with the
knowledge of what exactly a deepfake is along with a cautioned and careful
analysis of video and photographic evidence entered into evidence. Photo
and video analysis experts may emerge as an integral and necessary aspect
of cases involving video or photographic evidence as the technology
continues to advance. Judges may call for pre-trial Daubert hearings to
determine the reliability of expert evidence about deepfakes before the jury
ever has a chance to view the potentially damning evidence.
Similarly, deepfakes may rear their ugly head as jurors deliberate
questions of fact surrounding photos and videos. A well-aware and tech
savvy juror may question every video and photograph entered into evidence
with extreme inspection while the unaware and potentially naïve juror may
take videos at face value by giving the video evidence heartier weight than
should be allotted. Legal advocates will need to take into consideration the
values, understanding, and overall knowledge jurors have about deepfake
technology if a case involves audio, video, or photographic evidence.
XI.

CONCLUSION

Deepfake technology is an ever-evolving realm of digital modification
that allows users to create videos, audio, or photos of a person partaking in
an activity that person has never done and would never do. Deepfakes are
becoming rampant in the worlds of social media, entertainment, and
politics. A young but considerable danger of deepfake technology is making
its implication in the legal system. The history of evidence and
authentication of evidence has led to a lenient standard in which currently,
most videos and photos are admissible unless there is just cause to believe
otherwise. In the realm of the courtroom, deepfakes cause concern relating
to evidentiary admission as well as the style and method attorneys may use
in litigation to zealously advocate for their clients. As detection methods of
deepfakes grow more widespread, creators of deepfakes will constantly be
at war with those combatting it, trying always to be multiple steps ahead and
ensure their deepfake content will prevail. Legal scholars, social media
platforms, and news stations alike need to alert the general public to the use
of deepfakes so the common internet user will question the images
presented to them and, in turn, prevent the creation of an alternate reality.
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